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C O M M E N T  
The Reverse-Entanglement Principle: Why Religious 
Arbitration of Federal Rights Is Unconstitutional 
introduction 
Imagine you apply to be a cashier at a supermarket. At the beginning of the 
interview, you sign an employment application. You don’t get the job, and your 
interviewer’s remarks make you suspect it’s because you are Muslim. You sue in 
federal court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The supermarket 
moves to dismiss the suit because your employment application included an 
agreement to arbitrate all Title VII disputes. The court dismisses your case and 
compels arbitration. 
You arrive to see that the arbitrator is a pastor. When you protest, the em-
ployer reminds you that the agreement speciﬁed arbitration by a Christian tri-
bunal. And because the “Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation” permit 
holy scripture to trump federal law, you lose the case.
1
 The district court then 
upholds the arbitrator’s decision
2
 under the highly deferential standard of review 
mandated by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
3
 
This scenario will likely strike readers as both unfair and implausible. But as 
this Comment documents, numerous recent cases have compelled religious ar-
bitration of employment disputes, even in cases involving federal civil rights 
claims. Most strikingly, courts have compelled arbitration even when the arbi-




1. Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at 
*1-3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
2. Id. at *2-4. 
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (2018). 
4. Maynard v. Valley Christian Acad., Inc., No. 5:16-CV-01889, 2017 WL 3594670, at *5 (N.D. 
Ohio Aug. 21, 2017); Easterly, 2009 WL 2750099, at *3; Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Fla., Inc., 
122 So. 3d 986, 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Woodlands Christian Acad. v. Weibust, No. 
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This Comment argues that this practice is unlawful for two reasons. First, 
the Supreme Court has upheld civil rights arbitration only on the rationale that 
arbitrators faithfully apply federal law.
5
 This is not the case when a tribunal ex-
plicitly follows religious rules over federal law. Second, courts violate the Estab-
lishment Clause when they enforce arbitral decisions that apply religious princi-
ples to secular-law disputes. We argue that the Supreme Court’s entanglement 
jurisprudence is about ensuring secular adjudication of secular disputes and re-
ligious adjudication of religious disputes. We therefore articulate a “reverse-en-
tanglement” principle that protects secular law from religious interference. And 
although discrimination provides the most striking illustration of the stakes of 




The rest of the Comment proceeds as follows: Part I brieﬂy reviews the doc-
trine and critiques of civil rights arbitration. Part II documents the widespread 
nature of religious tribunals and shows how they uniquely undermine the Su-
preme Court’s justiﬁcation for civil rights arbitration. It also explains why liti-
gants have not been able to escape religious arbitration by asserting traditional 
contract defenses. Finally, Part III contends that allowing religious tribunals to 
arbitrate secular rights violates the Establishment Clause. 
i .  doctrine and critiques of arbitration  
This Part provides an overview of civil rights arbitration and surveys com-
mon critiques. Section I.A brieﬂy reviews the history of judicial deference to ar-
bitration, recounting its expansion from commercial disputes to those involving 
statutory rights. Section I.B draws on empirical evidence and case law to cast 
doubt on the Court’s insistence that arbitrators are suitable substitutes for judges 
in terms of how they apply and uphold the law. 
 
09-10-00010-CV, 2010 WL 3910366, at *5 (Tex. App. Oct. 7, 2010); see also Prescott v. North-
lake Christian Sch., No. CIV.A. 01-475, 2004 WL 2434997, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2004) (con-
ﬁrming an arbitration award under the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation), aff’d, 
141 F. App’x 263 (5th Cir. 2005); McCaffrey v. Phila. Montgomery Christian Acad., No. 3511 
EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11257191, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 9, 2013) (denying an anticipatory re-
quest to avoid arbitration under the Rules of Procedure for Christian Coalition). 
5. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255-60 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-33 (1991). 
6. For instance, the reverse-entanglement principle would also limit the extent to which religion 
can infuse arbitration of family-law, employment-law, and commercial disputes. 
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A. Case Law on Arbitration of Civil Rights 
Historically, common law courts were hostile to arbitration agreements.
7
 
Justice Story called arbitration “defective [and] imperfect,” arguing that arbitra-
tors “are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or eq-
uity, to administer either effectually.”
8
 Justice Story continued: 
[A]lthough a party may have entered into an agreement to submit his 
rights to arbitration, this furnishes no reason for a court of equity to de-
prive him of the right to withdraw from such agreement . . . and to de-




The Justice concluded that courts generally should not compel speciﬁc perfor-
mance of arbitration agreements.
10
 
In 1925, Congress passed the FAA “to reverse the longstanding judicial hos-
tility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the 
same footing as other contracts.”
11
 American courts gradually began to enforce 
arbitration agreements in admiralty and commercial contexts.
12
 In practice, this 
means that modern courts facilitate arbitration in two different procedural pos-
tures. First, when a plaintiff initiates a federal lawsuit in violation of an agree-
ment to arbitrate, the court will grant a defendant’s motion to dismiss and com-
pel arbitration. Second, after an arbitrator has resolved a dispute, the court will 
enter a judgment giving legal force to the arbitrator’s award. 
 
7. See Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1250-51 (2011). 
8. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). 
9. Id. at 1320. 
10. Id. at 1321-22. 
11. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 68-
96, at 1-2 (1924) (“The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. 
Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, 
they refused to enforce speciﬁc agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the courts were 
thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so long a period that the 
principle became ﬁrmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by 
the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly ﬁxed to be over-
turned without legislative enactment . . . .”). 
12. See, e.g., Kanmak Mills, Inc. v. Soc’y Brand Hat Co., 236 F.2d 240, 252 (8th Cir. 1956); Ky. 
River Mills v. Jackson, 206 F.2d 111, 121 (6th Cir. 1953); In re Util. Oil Corp., 69 F.2d 524, 526 
(2d Cir. 1934); The Gerald A. Fagan, 49 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1931), aff’d sub nom. Marine 
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932). Perhaps because the FAA was modeled on the 
New York Arbitration Act, the Second Circuit warmed to the new liberal view of arbitration 
before many other courts did. See Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 185 (D. Del. 1930) 
(noting that the FAA was based on the New York Arbitration Act). 
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From the 1970s onward, the Supreme Court has increasingly permitted ar-
bitration not just over commercial disputes but also in areas of the law that tra-
ditionally required adjudication by courts. In particular, although courts had 
long considered contracts to arbitrate federal statutory rights to be void as 
against public policy, by the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, courts had held 






 In the 
early 2000s, the Court took the dramatic additional step of holding that civil 
rights claims can be subject to arbitration. 
Two important cases permitting arbitration of civil rights disputes were 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
16
 and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.
17
 
The Supreme Court approved arbitration under a civil rights statute for the ﬁrst 
time in Gilmer, when it held that nothing in the text or legislative history of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) evinced congressional intent to 
shield age-discrimination claims from arbitration. And in Circuit City, the Court 
took no issue with an arbitration clause that swept even Title VII—which some 
called the “most important section” of the “most important civil rights legisla-
tion of the century”—within its reach.
18
 Sales counselor Saint Clair Adams sued 
Circuit City in state court for discrimination under a California civil rights stat-
ute, alleging “on-the-job harassment and retaliation based upon his sexual ori-
entation.”
19
 But Adams had signed a wide-ranging arbitration agreement in his 
employment application, which extended to all 
claims under federal, state, and local statutory or common law, such as 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and 
[the] law of tort.
20
 
Adams’s employer sought a court order to enforce this contract provision and 
compel arbitration under the FAA. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the FAA 
extended to employment contracts, including those requiring arbitration of dis-
 
13. Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 703, 715 (1999). 
14. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-40 (1985). 
15. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227-42 (1987). 
16. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
17. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
18. Berta E. Hernandez, Title VII v. Seniority: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court 
Taketh Away, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 339, 344 (1986). 
19. Brief of Respondent at *1, Circuit City, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1369473. 
20. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110. 
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crimination claims. Emphasizing the cost-saving beneﬁts of arbitration, the 
Court insisted that “arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA with-
out contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees spe-
ciﬁc protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.”
21
 
In the years since the Circuit City decision, the Supreme Court has also up-
held the arbitrability of a race-discrimination claim brought by a man passed 
over for promotion because he was black
22
 and age-discrimination claims 
brought by night watchmen forced out of their positions.
23
 Circuit courts have 







 In short, it is now settled law that civil rights 
disputes can be forced out of court and into arbitration. 
B. Problems with Arbitration: Threats to Substantive Rights 
The Supreme Court’s rationale for allowing civil rights arbitration rests on 
the dubious legal ﬁction that arbitrators protect statutory rights as effectively as 
do judges. In expanding the scope of arbitration, the Court has repeatedly recited 
a familiar incantation: “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
27
 The Court has further 




Despite these recitations, it is now well documented that arbitration provides 
diminished protection for statutory rights. Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen 
have argued that because arbitrators make a living from continued business with 
repeat players, they suffer from an “endemic disinclination to enforce legal 
rights.”
29
 Carrington and Haagen note that the FAA “confers a subpoena power 
 
21. Id. at 123. 
22. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72-76 (2010). 
23. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255-60 (2009). 
24. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 85 (4th Cir. 2005). 
25. See, e.g., Panepucci v. Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn LLP, 281 F. App’x 482, 483 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
26. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003). 
27. E.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 266 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 n.10 (2002) (quoting 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (quoting 
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26). 
28. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987). 
29. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 346. 
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on arbitrators, but otherwise makes no provisions for discovery,” which prevents 
arbitrators from “detecting wrongdoing and enforcing the rights of victims.”
30
 
They outline a host of other procedural deﬁciencies in the Act; for example, ar-
bitrators are not required to explain decisions or even to record the evidence that 
led to them.
31
 Carrington and Haagen’s forceful verdict is that “[n]o matter how 




Empirical studies support Carrington and Haagen’s diagnosis. One survey 
asked two hundred commercial arbitrators, “Do you always follow the law in 
formulating your awards?” A full twenty percent responded “No.”
33
 Even among 
those who said “Yes,” several arbitrators explained that they “tempered” their 
awards “with a concept of ‘equity.’”
34
 Another study likewise found that twenty 
percent of interviewed arbitrators did not agree “that they ought to reach their 
decisions within the context of the principles of substantive rules of law,” and 
“almost 90 per cent believed that they were free to ignore these rules whenever 
they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so doing.”
35
 
Research has found that arbitration may pose a special threat to substantive 
rights in the context of employment and labor law. For instance, women are less 
likely than men to win their claims and to be awarded attorneys’ fees or punitive 
damages in arbitration disputes that involve claims of Title VII workplace dis-
crimination.
36
 Another recent study found that employees are far likelier to lose 
in mandatory arbitration than in federal or state court; employees win in man-
datory arbitration only 21.4% of the time—compared to a 36% win rate in federal 
court and a 57% win rate in state court.
37
 And employees who do prevail in arbi-
tration win a median damages award that is “only 21 percent of the median award 




30. Id. at 348. 
31. Id. at 347. 
32. Id. at 349. 
33. Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction Arbitrators, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 154 (1994). 
34. Id. at 155. 
35. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961). 
36. Kenneth F. Dunham, Great Gilmer’s Ghost: The Haunting Tale of the Role of Employment Arbi-
tration in the Disappearance of Statutory Rights in Discrimination Cases, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
303, 319 (2005) (citing Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail 
in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 576-77 (2005)). 
37. Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights, ECON. POL’Y INST. 20 (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.epi.org/ﬁles/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/69BZ-NVGN]. 
38. Id. at 19. 
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Parties forced to arbitrate their statutory rights are also denied any oppor-
tunity to have a judge review the substance of the arbitrator’s decision. Section 
10 of the FAA provides only four grounds for vacating an arbitration award: cor-
ruption or fraud; partiality; prejudicial misconduct; and exceeding arbitral 
power or failing to make an award.
39
 Section 11 provides similarly narrow 
grounds for modifying an award, such as “material miscalculation.”
40
 Notably, 
the statute does not list legal error as a ground for vacatur. In Hall Street Associ-
ates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the Supreme Court suggested in dicta that recognizing 
even “‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a further ground for vacatur on top of 
those listed in § 10” would violate the plain meaning of the FAA.
41
 The Court 
instead argued “that §§ 10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review [of 
arbitration awards] provided by the statute.”
42
 The Court added that “‘[f]raud’ 
and a mistake of law are not cut from the same cloth.”
43
 In a later case, the Court 
further called into question (without ultimately deciding) whether a judicial-
review exception for manifest disregard of the law survived Hall Street.
44
 
In light of Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
have expressly held that manifest disregard of the law is not a reason to overturn 
an arbitral decision.
45
 In the Seventh Circuit, a jurisdiction where manifest dis-
regard survives as a ground for vacatur, that standard applies only when an ar-
bitrator actually “directs the parties to violate the law.”
46
 While circuits disagree 
on manifest disregard, all of them enforce a standard of review for arbitration 
 
39. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2018). 
40. Id. § 11(a). 
41. 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008). 
42. Id. at 590. 
43. Id. at 586. 
44. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 672 n.3 (2010). 
45. See, e.g., Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
“judicially-created bases for vacatur,” including “manifest disregard,” “are no longer valid in 
light of Hall Street”); Med. Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 
(8th Cir. 2010) (holding in light of Hall Street that “an arbitral award may be vacated only for 
the reasons enumerated in the FAA”); Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that Hall Street restricts the grounds for vacatur to those set 
forth in § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act . . . and consequently, manifest disregard of the 
law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”); see 
also Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration Law in Tension After Hall Street: Accuracy or Finality?, 39 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 75, 99 (2016) (citing Bellantuono v. ICAP Sec. USA, LLC, 557 
F. App’x 168, 173 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (surveying other circuit precedent and declining to decide 
the issue for the Third Circuit)). 
46. Renard v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 778 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing George Watts 
& Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 579-81 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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that is far more limited than the de novo review of legal conclusions to which a 
litigant is entitled when appealing an identical claim from a trial court. 
In sum, the Court has interpreted the FAA to compel and enforce arbitration 
not only in commercial disputes, but also regarding statutory-rights claims. It 
has recently expanded mandatory arbitration’s scope to include civil rights 
claims, arguing that arbitrators follow the law like judges. But there is consider-
able reason to doubt the truth of this assertion. Studies show a systemic failure 
by arbitrators to protect statutory rights as well as courts do, and the Court’s 
own jurisprudence holds arbitrators to a lower standard than it does judges. 
i i .  the special threat of religious arbitration  
This Part argues that religious arbitration poses additional threats to statu-
tory rights by openly subordinating secular law to holy texts.
47
 Many religious 
arbitrators are trained as church leaders. The problem is not that these arbitra-
tors are untrained in law; some of them may in fact be attorneys. Rather, the 
issue is that these arbitrators might be committed to an entirely different legal 
tradition—one in which religious principles, not secular statutes, reign supreme. 
Section II.A documents the pervasiveness of religious arbitration, showing that 
thousands of Americans of many faiths are forced to participate. Section II.B 
demonstrates how religious tribunals subordinate secular law to religious law. 
Section II.C explains why litigants are unlikely to escape religious arbitration by 
mounting traditional contractual or statutory defenses. Finally, Section II.D dis-
cusses how the effective-vindication doctrine might apply to the religious arbi-
tration of statutory rights. 
A. The Prevalence of Religious Arbitration 
Thousands of Americans submit to religious arbitration every year. In 2012, 
the Institute of Christian Conciliation (ICC) claimed to conduct around one 
hundred conciliations annually, with up to ﬁfteen hundred additional religious 
arbitrations per year carried out by ICC-certiﬁed “conciliators” around the coun-
try.
48
 On top of that, the ICC claimed to make more than one thousand yearly 
 
47. Religious arbitration institutes often advertise the religious qualiﬁcations of their adjudica-
tors. The Institute of Christian Conciliation (ICC) publicizes that its certiﬁed arbitrators in-
clude “pastors” and “lay leaders in Christian churches.” Are the Mediators & Arbitrators Quali-
ﬁed?, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, http://www.iccpeace.com/certiﬁcation.html 
[https://perma.cc/7T38-KGKS]. Likewise, the Beth Din of America convenes panels of rabbis 
to serve as arbitrators. BETH DIN AM., https://bethdin.org [https://perma.cc/DV2H-C5ZF]. 
48. See Nicholas Walter, Religious Arbitration in the United States and Canada, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 501, 520 & n.130 (2012). 
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“coaching calls,” in which it encouraged litigants to settle their disputes accord-
ing to ICC principles.
49
 Jewish arbitration is also deeply entrenched. Most major 
American cities have a standing beth din, or Jewish tribunal. New York City 
alone has four rabbinic courts.
50
 One of these four, the Beth Din of America, 
hears approximately three hundred divorce cases and one hundred commercial 
cases per year, in addition to landlord-tenant, wrongful-termination, and other 
disputes.
51
 The number of commercial cases has almost doubled over the past 
decade, suggesting that Jewish arbitration is “on the rise.”
52
 The West Coast 
Rabbinical Court, one of multiple Jewish tribunals in Los Angeles, arbitrated 
around sixty-ﬁve commercial disputes last year, as well as disputes over divorces 
and kosher laws.
53
 These and many other tribunals advertise that they follow 
secular law and commercial practices only to the “extent permitted by Jewish 
Law.”
54
 Islamic arbitration arrived in America more recently but is also starting 
to gain traction.
55
 There are already several reported cases of secular courts up-




49. Id. at 520 n.129. 
50. See New York, GET RESOURCE CTR., http://getaget.com/BeitDin.aspx [https://perma.cc
/C3HF-K6DZ]. 
51. Journal of the Beth Din of America, J. BETH DIN AM. 7 (2014), http://bethdin.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/07/JBDAVol2.pdf [https://perma.cc/49VQ-H3D6]; Sukhsimranjit Singh & 
Michael Avi Helfand, When Arbitration Goes Religious: A Lawyer’s Toolkit for Religious Arbitra-
tion, A.B.A. slide 10 (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events
/dispute_resolution/cle_and_mtg_planning_board/teleconferences/2017-2018/DR1718
_materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/US97-GFCY]. 
52. Michael A. Helfand, The Future of Religious Arbitration in the United States: Looking Through a 
Pluralist Lens, in OXFORD LEGAL HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Paul Schiff Berman 
ed., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086833. 
53. Arbitration, W. COAST RABBINICAL CT., http://www.beth-din.org/ﬁnancial-arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/JYQ5-NADG]. 
54. Arbitration at the Beth Din of America, BETH DIN AM. 3 (2015), http://bethdin.org/wp-content
/uploads/2015/07/ArbBrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ4C-LURL]; see also Rules and Pro-
cedures of the Beth Din Zedek of the Chicago Rabbinical Council, CHI. RABBINICAL COUNCIL 4, 
http://www.crcweb.org/Beth_Din_Rules_and_Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MKK 
-L4QF] (“The Beth Din . . . accepts that Jewish law . . . will provide the rules of procedure 
and rules of decision that govern the functioning of the Beth Din . . . .”). 
55. See Michael Broyde, Sharia in America, WASH. POST (June 30, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/30/sharia-in-america [https://
perma.cc/UQB8-QG4T] (“Islamic courts are becoming common in North America.”). 
56. See, e.g., Hamzavi v. Ahmad, No. 205592, 1999 WL 33452466 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999); 
Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Matahen v. Sehwail, No. 
C-7-15, 2016 WL 1136602 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2016); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 
S.W.3d 404, 413 (Tex. App. 2003). 
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B. When Religious Precepts Conﬂict with Secular Law 
The idea that religious tribunals prioritize holy law over federal statutory law 
is not mere speculation. It is explicitly one of the terms for which parties contract 
when they agree to arbitrate disputes before a religious tribunal. For example, 
parties who contract for the services of the ICC are bound by the Rules of Pro-
cedure for Christian Conciliation (RPCC), which provide: 
Rule 4. Conciliators shall take into consideration any state, federal, or 
local laws that the parties bring to their attention, but the Holy Scriptures 




Rule 4 explicitly subordinates American law to religious precepts and openly de-
ﬁes the Supreme Court’s instruction that arbitrators should apply substantive 
law in the same manner that a court would. Under the rationale of cases like 
Circuit City, no arbitrator following this rule should be allowed to adjudicate 
statutory rights. And yet this clause has been upheld and enforced by at least two 
state courts and two federal courts.
58
 
Courts’ attempts to rationalize away the problems with this rule have been 
unsatisfactory. In Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools, Inc., the district court 
compelled a ﬁred schoolteacher to adjudicate her age- and disability-discrimina-
tion claims before a Christian tribunal. The plaintiff argued that RPCC Rule 4 
made her arbitration contract unenforceable because she would have to “forego  
vindication of her substantive rights guaranteed by the ADEA and ADA . . . and 
instead rely on biblical scripture to deﬁne her rights.”
59
 The court was unmoved. 
Finding comfort in “the provision requir[ing] the arbitrator to take into consid-
eration the applicable law,” the court claimed that “the same is essentially true of 
a federal judge, in light of the fact that a party can waive an argument—e.g. that 
a particular case or statute applies—by failing to raise it.”
60
 But this analogy is 
unpersuasive. Rule 4 allows an arbitrator to decide on the merits that a plaintiff’s 
civil rights have been violated but then merely take that ﬁnding “into considera-
 
57. Rules of Procedure, INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, http://www.iccpeace.com/Rules 
/index.html [https://perma.cc/5X7G-AQXG]. 
58. See, in addition to the cases discussed below, Encore Products. Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. 
Supp. 2d 1101, 1119 (D. Colo. 1999), and Maynard v. Valley Christian Academy, Inc., No. 5:16-
CV-01889, 2017 WL 3594670, at *4-11 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2017), in which the courts rejected 
a host of contract defenses and compelled religious arbitration. 
59. Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 2750099, at 
*3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
60. Id. at *3 n.2. 




 and perhaps hold it outweighed by scriptural commandments. By con-
trast, if a judge reached the merits of a plaintiff’s civil rights claim and found a 
violation, the plaintiff would necessarily prevail. And more fundamentally, the 
Supreme Court has emphasized that arbitration of statutory rights is legitimate 
precisely because it does not amount to waiver of those rights.
62
 
Rule 4 also made an appearance in Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc.,
63
 
in which a mother was forced to arbitrate her son’s wrongful-death claim before 
a Christian tribunal. Nicklaus Spivey died of a drug overdose after a religious 
rehabilitation center, following an attempt to “de-gay” him, threw Spivey out 
“[on]to the streets of Jacksonville” for violating program rules.
64
 When his 
mother objected to Rule 4, the court dismissed her concerns by interpreting the 
Rule to mean holy scripture would trump secular law only in matters of “pro-
cess” rather than substance.
65
 
However, an examination of the other RPCC rules makes this reading im-
plausible; the rules are procedural in name only. Other rules clarify that scripture 
can and should guide the arbitrator’s substantive decisions. On the merits, the 
ICC’s Standard of Conduct for Christian Conciliators instructs that a “Christian 
conciliator shall encourage and support only scripturally sound decisions and 
actions (Micah 6:8).”
66
 This involves encouraging “repentance, confession, for-
giveness, and reconciliation whenever sin has occurred or a relationship has been 
broken (Luke 17:3; Gal. 6:1; 2 Tim. 4:2).”
67
 The arbitrator “shall . . . help the 
parties to make decisions, to take actions, and to change their lifestyles, habits, 
and conduct as God has instructed in the Scriptures.”
68
 In crafting an arbitral 
award, arbitrators “may grant any remedy or relief that they deem scriptural, just 
and equitable, and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.”
69
 And per-
haps most strikingly, “the Christian conciliator shall respect the legitimate juris-
 
61. Rules of Procedure, supra note 57. 
62. See infra Section II.D. 
63. 122 So. 3d 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
64. Id. at 989; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is 
the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03
/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html [https://
perma.cc/82CB-TCL7]. 
65. Spivey, 122 So. 3d at 993. 




68. Id. at 27. 
69. Id. at 24. 
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diction of civil authorities and shall cooperate with them as required by law, un-
less there is a clear scriptural reason to do otherwise (Acts 4:19; Rom. 13:1-7).”
70
 
These rules strongly suggest that Christian Conciliation is not just a matter 
of process.
71
 They seem to instruct arbitrators to steer parties toward a scriptur-
ally sanctioned outcome.
72
 They appear to give arbitrators permission to craft 
biblically based remedies. And they make clear that scripture, not the “jurisdic-
tion of civil authorities,” is sacrosanct.
73
 
While these examples concern the rules for Christian Conciliation, the reli-
gious principles of other faith-based tribunals also come into tension with secu-
lar law. For example, under Sharia law, a woman’s testimony may be given half 
as much evidentiary weight as a man’s.
74
 In Britain, where Islamic arbitration is 
widespread, the Parliament has considered legislation to prevent Sharia panels 
from treating “the evidence of a man [as] worth more than the evidence of a 
woman.”
75
 Numerous civil rights groups, including the Iranian and Kurdish 
Women’s Rights Organization, have backed the bill.
76
 Some scholars have fur-
ther argued that Sharia family law may substantively disadvantage women, as 
discussed in Part III.
77
 Similarly, under traditional Jewish law, “women, non-




70. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
71. If anything, the ICC rules are more deferential to secular procedure than to secular substantive 
law. See id. at 25 (“Should these Rules vary from state or federal arbitration statutes, these Rules 
shall control except where the state or federal rules speciﬁcally indicate that they may not be 
superseded.” (emphasis added)). This Rule, which explicitly allows ICC procedure to be 
preempted by an arbitration statute, stands in contrast to many of the other rules quoted 
above, which explicitly allow scripture to preempt secular authorities. 
72. Although the court ultimately did not rule for this appellant, it is interesting to note the fol-
lowing claim in an appeal following an ICC conciliation: “Appellant also alleged that the ICC 
placed Appellant under duress by using Christian guilt to deter Appellant from vindicating 
her legal rights.” McCaffrey v. Phila. Montgomery Christian Acad., No. 3511 EDA 2012, 2013 
WL 11257191, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 9, 2013). 
73. Guidelines for Christian Conciliation, supra note 66, at 28. 
74. See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Taking Religion out of Civil Divorce, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 395, 
405 (2013). 
75. Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill 2016-17, HL Bill [18] cl. 1(2) (Eng. & 
Wales), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0018/17018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SQG8-X3QZ]. 
76. Ashley Nickel, Abusing the System: Domestic Violence Judgments from Sharia Arbitration Tribu-
nals Create Parallel Legal Structures in the United Kingdom, 4 ARB. BRIEF 92, 104 (2014). 
77. See infra Section III.D. 
78. Michael C. Grossman, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and Due Process, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 191 (2007) (citing 1 EMMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC 
CIVIL LAW 255-57 (1990)). Whether women may serve as witnesses on matters of Jewish law 
is a topic of contemporary rabbinic debate. In 2001, the Rabbinical Assembly—an association 
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To put a point on it: despite protestations of district courts to the contrary, 
religious tribunals explicitly admit to prioritizing scriptural edicts over substan-
tive secular law. These religious tribunals rule on thousands of disputes every 
year, and according to the Supreme Court’s scope-of-arbitration jurisprudence, 
such tribunals can adjudicate issues involving federal statutory rights—includ-
ing civil rights. Moreover, under the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 
grounds on which an arbitration award can be vacated under the FAA, the fact 
that a religious tribunal failed to enforce federal rights because of a contrary 
scriptural commandment might not be enough to overturn an arbitral judgment. 
The result is that religious arbitrators can explicitly disregard the secular law, 
and that disregard may be insufficient to warrant review. 
C. Contractual Defenses and Why They Often Fail 
Courts have also shown a reluctance to invalidate religious-arbitration 
clauses under traditional contract-law doctrines. For instance, litigants have not 
been especially successful in arguing that religious arbitration clauses are uncon-
scionable. In a 2011 article, Michael Helfand hypothesized that unconscionability 
could provide “a safety net for protecting parties from the potential dangers of 
religious arbitration.”
79
 However, recent precedent shows this has not come to 
pass. This Section suggests that courts may be disinclined to ﬁnd procedural un-
conscionability because federal policy favors arbitration. And courts may be un-
willing to even reach the question of substantive unconscionability for fear of 
embarking on an impermissible analysis of church law. Other contract defenses, 
like arguments that these arbitration agreements are illusory, fare no better. 
Courts will decline to enforce contracts that they ﬁnd to be unconscionable. 
The party challenging the contract generally has the burden of proving both sub-
 
of rabbis identifying with Conservative, rather than more traditional Orthodox, beliefs—
voted to allow female witnesses by a narrow eight-seven margin. See Susan Grossman, Edut 
Nashim K’Edut Anashim: The Testimony of Women Is as the Testimony of Men, COMMITTEE ON 
JEWISH L. & STANDARDS RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY 1, 15 (Oct. 31, 2001), https://www 
.rabbinicalassembly.org/sites/default/ﬁles/public/halakhah/teshuvot/19912000/grossman
_womenedut.pdf [https://perma.cc/JVH3-U2Z5]. At least one Rabbi who voted in favor of 
the proposal wrote separately to clarify that women still should not serve as witnesses to di-
vorce proceedings, as that “would render that document ineffective for virtually all Orthodox 
rabbis, and for some Conservative rabbis.” Aaron Mackler, Edut Nashim K’Edut Anashim: The 
Testimony of Women Is as the Testimony of Men: A Concurring Opinion, COMMITTEE ON JEWISH 
L. & STANDARDS RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY 4 (Oct. 31, 2001), https://www.rabbinicalassembly
.org/sites/default/ﬁles/public/halakhah/teshuvot/20052010/mackler_women_witnesses
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FE3-NBH9]. 
79. Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conﬂicting 
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1294 (2011). 
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stantive and procedural unconscionability.
80
 The procedural prong focuses on 
unequal bargaining power.
81
 However, not all contracts of adhesion—that is, 
contracts drafted by the more powerful party and offered to the weaker party on 
a “take it or leave it” basis—are unconscionable.
82
 A contract of adhesion may 
indicate, but usually is not dispositive of, procedural unconscionability.
83
 And 
the litigant will also have to prevail on the substantive prong, which focuses on 
“‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”
84
 The following case study shows how 
parties defending against religious arbitration have struggled to satisfy both 
prongs of the unconscionability test. 
In 2015, Maria and Luis Garcia sued their local Church of Scientology for 
fraudulently inducing them to donate nearly four hundred thousand dollars to 
religious and humanitarian initiatives, for which the funds were not used.
85
 The 
Garcias, both former Scientologists, sought to invalidate on grounds of uncon-
scionability a contractual provision binding them to Scientologist arbitration.
86
 
Citing the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”
87
 the district court com-
pelled arbitration despite strong evidence of unfairness to the plaintiffs.
88
 The 
Garcias presented numerous facts that suggested procedural unconscionability. 
The arbitration clause was part of a contract of adhesion (the church enrollment 
application), and the court acknowledged that the Church had failed to establish 
“particularized rules and procedures for conducting arbitration” and even that 
“there ha[d] never been an arbitration in the Church” until that point.
89
 Never-
theless, the court refused to ﬁnd the clause procedurally unconscionable because 
“the Garcias had ‘some idea’ of what disputes were subject to arbitration and the 
procedures by which the arbitration was to be effected.”
90
 
The plaintiffs arguably had an even stronger claim of substantive uncon-
scionability, which the court refused to consider. The Garcias presented evidence 
 
80. See HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19:41 (2018); 1 THOMAS H. 
OEHMKE & JOAN M. BROVINS, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 10:2 (2018). 
81. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) (interpreting Califor-
nia’s unconscionability doctrine). 
82. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 2005). 
83. See, e.g., Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., 1 A.3d 678, 687-88 (N.J. 2010). 
84. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340 (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 
Cal. 4th 83, 114 (2000)). 
85. Garcia v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 
10844160, at *1 n.2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2015). 
86. Id. at *1-2. 
87. Id. at *3 (quoting Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
88. Id. at *12. 
89. Id. at *6-7. 
90. Id. at *8. 
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that, as lapsed members of the faith, the Church had declared them “[s]uppres-
sive.”
91
 They further showed that Church doctrine gave suppressive individuals 
“no rights as Scientologists” and mandated that they were “not eligible for the 
beneﬁts of the Codes of the Church.”
92
 Worse still, Church doctrine prohibited 
“Scientologists in good standing . . . from communicating with suppressive in-
dividuals.”
93
 Although the plaintiffs did not allege this, this prohibition could 
extend even to the arbitrator, a Scientologist in good standing.
94
 But the district 
court refused to hear evidence of substantive unconscionability on grounds that 
“the First Amendment prohibits consideration of this contention, since it neces-
sarily would require an analysis and interpretation of Scientology doctrine.”
95
 
(This is a classic entanglement argument—one that the next Part will turn on its 
head.) In short, the strong presumptions in favor of arbitration and against in-




Other litigants are likely to fare even worse than did the Garcias. Some courts 
have been reluctant to declare employment applications—the documents that 
house many religious arbitration agreements—to be contracts of adhesion. The 
notion is that because a job applicant is free to seek employment elsewhere and 
is not forced to sign anything he does not want to, the arbitration agreement is 
not unconscionable.
97
 Also, in contrast to the Church of Scientology, the ICC 
 





96. For other cases ﬁnding religious arbitration agreements not unconscionable or coercive, see 
Graves v. George Fox University, No. CV06-395-S-EJL, 2007 WL 2363372, at *5-7 (D. Idaho 
Aug. 16, 2007); McCaffrey v. Philadelphia Montgomery Christian Academy, No. 3511 EDA 2012, 
2013 WL 11257191, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 9, 2013) (“The contract cited the Bible immedi-
ately before delineating the requirement for biblically-based mediation . . . . Given the express 
terms of the employment agreement, which Appellant repeatedly signed over ﬁve years, we 
ﬁnd that Appellant’s arguments of coercion, duress, impartiality, and lack of notice fail.”); 
and Woodlands Christian Academy v. Weibust, No. 09-10-00010-CV, 2010 WL 3910366, at *6 
(Tex. App. Oct. 7, 2010). Hobby Lobby’s arbitration clause, which offers both secular and 
religious arbitration options, has similarly been upheld as not unconscionable. Fardig v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., No. SACV 14-561 JVS(ANx), 2014 WL 2810025, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. 
June 13, 2014); Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1081 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
But see Higher Ground Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Arks, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-00077-BLW, 2011 WL 
4738651, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 6, 2011) (ﬁnding a religious arbitration clause unconscionable 
but not due to the religiosity of the arbitration). 
97. See, e.g., Maynard v. Valley Christian Acad., Inc., No. 5:16-CV-01889, 2017 WL 3594670, at 
*8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2017) (“Ohio courts have recognized ‘that when a candidate for em-
ployment is free to look elsewhere for employment and is not otherwise forced to consent to 
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and many batei din have well-established and well-publicized rules of proce-
dure,
98
 which will undermine a litigant’s claim of procedural unconscionabil-
ity.
99
 In Maynard v. Valley Christian Academy, Inc., a district court refused to ﬁnd 
unconscionability because the ICC’s “website” was a “conventionally convenient 
avenue of access to the Rules [of Procedure for Christian Conciliation],” and the 
plaintiff also “could have phoned [the ICC] or even initiated written correspond-
ence to request additional information or an explanation of the Rules.”
100
 Al-
though few new hires pause to research religious arbitration rules before signing 
their employment contracts, the accessibility of those rules poses a substantial 
barrier to unconscionability claims. 
The existence of these organizations’ concrete and well-publicized rules also 
undermines a second possible contract defense, namely that a religious arbitra-
tion clause constitutes an illusory promise. The Easterly court acknowledged that 
an arbitration agreement may be invalidated as an illusory promise if one of the 
parties “maintained the right to essentially make up the rules as it went along.”
101
 
But the Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation are “promulgated by an 
uninvolved third party, much like the rules established by the American Arbitra-
tion Association.”
102
 And critically, in the Maynard court’s words, “the Rules of 
Christian Conciliation” do not “include any express reservation of indeﬁnite 
 
the arbitration agreement, the agreement to arbitrate is not unconscionable.’” (quoting Short 
v. Res. Title Agency, No. 95839, 2011 WL 1203906, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2011))); 
Rogers v. Brown, 986 F. Supp. 354, 359 (M.D. La. 1997) (holding that a fast-food job applicant 
“could have avoided the clause by simply rejecting the employment with the defendant,” and 
noting that the plaintiff “failed to submit any evidence that other similar jobs were not avail-
able and thus, she was required to take the KFC job even though she did not approve of the 
arbitration provision”); Krusinski v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 239873, 2004 WL 315171, at 
*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2004) (observing that “plaintiff did not feel that she had no choice 
but to accept defendant’s conditions; she was perfectly prepared to turn down a summer job 
and continue working at her present employment if the proffered job was not to her liking”); 
Young v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 688 A.2d 1069, 1078 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (observing 
that Gilmer “obviously contemplated avoidance of the arbitration clause only upon circum-
stances substantially more egregious than the ordinary economic pressure faced by every em-
ployee who needs the job”). But see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that Circuit City’s employment application constituted an unconscionable 
contract of adhesion). 
98. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 57; see also supra note 54. 
99. See, e.g., Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1714-WTL-TAB, 2009 WL 
2750099, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2009). 
100. Maynard, 2017 WL 3594670, at *8. 
101. Easterly, 2009 WL 2750099, at *3. 
102. Id. 
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Nor, generally, are religious arbitration clauses void for lack of consideration. 
Where an arbitration clause is “binding on both” parties, the “mutual obliga-
tion” will usually constitute sufficient consideration under state law.
104
 In 
Maynard, for instance, the court found there was consideration because both the 
employee and the religious employer were contractually bound to resolve dis-
putes through Christian mediation.
105
 
D. Effective Vindication: A Narrow Exception for Statutory Rights 
Litigants might also try to invoke a “judge-made exception to the FAA” that 
allows courts to “invalidate agreements that prevent the ‘effective vindication’ of 
a federal statutory right.”
106
 In 1985, the Supreme Court suggested it might in-
validate “as against public policy” an arbitration agreement that operated as a 
“prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”
107
 In subse-
quent cases, though, the Court repeatedly found that arbitral fora did provide an 
adequate opportunity to vindicate statutory rights.
108
 The Court, for example, 
upheld as effectively vindicating rights an agreement requiring small businesses 
to arbitrate antitrust claims against American Express individually rather than as 
a class.
109
 It even held that a Japanese arbitrator could effectively vindicate an 




The Court further clariﬁed that arbitration agreements concerning discrim-
ination claims under civil rights laws warrant no special treatment. In 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Court criticized one of its earlier cases because it “errone-
ously assumed that an agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to 
 
103. Maynard, 2017 WL 3594670, at *4. 
104. Id. at *9; see, e.g., Williams-Jackson v. Innovative Senior Care Home Health of Edmond, LLC, 
727 F. App’x. 965, 969 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[B]inding, mutual promises made by an employer 
and employee to arbitrate supply adequate consideration to support an arbitration agree-
ment.”); Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2002) (“An employer’s promise 
to arbitrate in exchange for an employee’s promise to do the same constitutes sufficient con-
sideration to support the arbitration agreement.”). 
105. Maynard, 2017 WL 3594670, at *9. 
106. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct, 2304, 2310 (2013). 
107. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985). 
108. See, e.g., Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273-74 
(2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). 
109. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311-12. 
110. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37. 
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arbitration was tantamount to a waiver of those rights.”
111
 It also asserted that 
an “arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends 
with equal force to discrimination claims” as to “contractual disputes.”
112
 Thus, 
without more, the mere fact that a litigant is forced to submit statutory claims—
even civil rights claims—to arbitration will not amount to ineffective vindication 
or prospective waiver. 
The Court has, however, acknowledged the possibility that some arbitration 
clauses, including those “forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights” in 
court or in arbitration, or those imposing ﬁling fees “so high as to make access 
to the forum impracticable,” could violate the prospective-waiver rule.
113
 Indeed, 
some lower courts have used the effective-vindication doctrine to invalidate ar-
bitration agreements—for instance, where an arbitration agreement explicitly 
waived the Title VII right to attorneys’ fees.
114
 At the extreme, a religious tribu-
nal that categorically refuses to vindicate a certain federal right on scriptural 
grounds arguably fails to provide a true right to pursue a statutory remedy. And 
more broadly, perhaps a religious tribunal that merely “take[s] into considera-
tion” federal law fails to treat federal law as creating binding rights at all. Liti-
gants could argue that such a tribunal provides at most a possibility, but not a 
right, of pursuing statutory remedies. Religious arbitration of secular statutory 
rights may well be a rare example of ineffective vindication. But the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to expand that doctrine, as well as its unpredictable applica-
tion in the lower courts, makes it a less-than-ideal tool for litigants seeking to 
avoid arbitration. 
To take stock: litigants challenging a religious-arbitration clause are unlikely 
to prevail under common law doctrines of unconscionability or illusory promise. 
Furthermore, courts generally adhere to the ﬁction that parties do not waive any 
statutory rights by agreeing to arbitrate. Because courts tend to rest their hold-
ings on federal statutory arbitration policy or the Free Exercise Clause, these lit-
igants need a theory of equal weight. In light of the absence of strong contractual 
or statutory defenses to religious arbitration, the next Part offers a constitutional 
solution. 
 
111. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 265. 
112. Id. at 268, 269. 
113. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11. 
114. See, e.g., Safranek v. Copart, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 927, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Gambardella v. 
Pentec, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 237, 246-47 (D. Conn. 2002). Where a plaintiff merely argues that 
arbitration is too expensive, courts may be less sympathetic. One district court found that a 
plaintiff who couldn’t afford arbitration because she was unemployed, heavily in debt, unin-
sured, feeding one child and pregnant with another, and supporting family abroad was not 
exempted from arbitration because it was still possible for her “to obtain gainful employ-
ment.” Koridze v. Fannie Mae Corp., 593 F. Supp. 2d 863, 870 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
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i i i .  the reverse-entanglement principle  
Arbitrators have the power to rule on federal rights, subject to minimal judi-
cial review, and case law in practice allows religious arbitrators to override secu-
lar law in favor of religious law. The intersection of these two facts means that a 
virtually unreviewable religious tribunal can have the ﬁnal say on whether a cit-
izen’s federal rights were violated. Religious arbitration thus has the potential to 
gravely threaten civil rights. We think most readers, regardless of their feelings 
about religion or arbitration generally, would have misgivings about a Sharia ar-
bitrator adjudicating gay rights or an Orthodox beth din adjudicating gender-
discrimination claims. But this isn’t just worrisome—it’s unconstitutional. 
The remainder of this Comment offers a constitutional solution to protect 
federal rights from religious interference. Commentators have previously iden-
tiﬁed a few ways in which religious arbitration implicates the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment. For instance, Jeff Dasteel has argued that courts violate 
the Free Exercise Clause when they compel the weaker party to a contract of ad-
hesion to participate in religious arbitration.
115
 And, as will be discussed below, 
the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions addressed the Establishment 
Clause problems that arise when courts encroach on the power of religious tri-
bunals. To date, however, no one has identiﬁed the Establishment Clause prob-
lem that arises when religious courts pose a threat to secular rights. This Com-
ment argues that courts violate the Establishment Clause when they enforce 
arbitration that entangles religious principles with secular law. It articulates a 
reverse-entanglement principle, which provides an alternative theory under 
which litigants can challenge coercive religious-arbitration clauses. 
A. “Reverse” Entanglement: A Longstanding Constitutional Principle 
At ﬁrst glance, the Supreme Court’s headline-grabbing Establishment 
Clause precedents may seem largely unrelated to court-church entanglement. 
Better-known cases tend to arise when the state throws its weight behind a par-
ticular religious practice—by displaying a nativity scene, for instance, or by man-
dating school prayer. In court-church entanglement cases, by contrast, the state 
is not adopting one religion over another. Thus, the Supreme Court’s standard 
tests for Establishment Clause violations may feel inapposite.
116
 For this reason, 
 
115. Jeff Dasteel, Religious Arbitration Agreements in Contracts of Adhesion, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIA-
TION 45, 61 (2016) (“When a court orders a party to engage in religious arbitration, the court 
is requiring the party to participate in religion or its exercise, thereby substantially burdening 
that person’s free exercise of religion.”). 
116. Cf. Newdow v. Roberts, 603 F.3d 1002, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not set forth a one-size-
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some academics have disparaged the Court’s church-state entanglement prece-
dents as archaic.
117
 But understanding what is really at stake in these cases can 
shed light on the mysterious “entanglement” prong in well-known Establish-
ment Clause cases like Lemon v. Kurtzman.
118
 
A commonly invoked principle for disallowing court-church entanglement 
is church autonomy.
119
 On this view, the Establishment Clause’s ban on entan-
glement protects the freedom of religious organizations to decide religious ques-
tions without secular government interference.
120 
A problem with this view, 
however, is that it makes the Establishment Clause’s entanglement prohibition 
superﬂuous; the Free Exercise Clause already shields religious liberty from state 
interference. Some courts and commentators have recognized this and have con-
cluded that entanglement is really a Free Exercise Clause issue, not an Establish-
ment Clause one.
121
 But that is the wrong conclusion to draw. In addition to 
threatening individual free exercise, entanglement may pose an additional harm 
that is at the very heart of the Establishment Clause. 
The Constitution states that the government “shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
122
 These 
are two separate edicts, which means that an Establishment Clause violation can 
arise even when no person is deprived of religious liberty. If every single citizen 
converted to Judaism tomorrow, it would still offend the Constitution for Con-
gress to declare America a Jewish state. It would make no difference if the law 
coerced no one—or even if every single person voted for it.
123
 The Constitution 
independently bars governmental establishment of religion, even if not a single 
citizen’s free exercise is infringed upon. Thus, it must be the case that the entan-
glement prohibition in the Establishment Clause is not solely concerned with 
individual rights. 
 
ﬁts-all test . . . . Rather, the Court ordinarily analyzes cases under various issue-speciﬁc rules 
and standards it has devised.”). 
117. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAU-
CRATIC SOCIETY 177 (1986); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint 
on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 50 (1998). 
118. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
119. Esbeck, supra note 117, at 44. 
120. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). 
121. See Esbeck, supra note 117, at 50-51 & n.208 (critiquing courts and scholars for taking this view 
and arguing that entanglement presents a structural Establishment Clause problem). 
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
123. While this observation might seem odd, it is what the Amendment says on its face. To be sure, 
some of the founders like James Madison viewed coercion of religious minorities as the great 
evil associated with a national religion. See 1 THOMAS HART BENTON, ABRIDGMENT OF THE 
DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 138 (N.Y.C., D. Appleton & Co. 1860). 
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What, then, does the Establishment Clause protect that other constitutional 
provisions do not? Simply put, the Establishment Clause’s “wall of separation 
between church and state” is what keeps religion out of government.
124
 Just as 
the Free Exercise Clause “secure[s] religious liberty from the invasions of the 
civil authority,” the Establishment Clause “rescue[s] temporal institutions from 
religious interference.”
125
 It gives force to the familiar liberal idea that the moral 
legitimacy of government action depends on secular reason giving. The state 
cannot exercise coercive power arbitrarily—it must justify its laws and acts, and 
it must do so in terms that are meaningful to all citizens. 
Political theorists have struggled to deﬁne the precise contours of what con-
stitutes a legitimate “public reason” for government action.
126
 It simply is not 
true that secular reasons are acceptable to all whereas religious reasons are only 
acceptable to a few. “We passed this law because it will drastically redistribute 
wealth” is a justiﬁcation as objectionable to a libertarian as “We passed this law 
because the Koran commands it” is to an atheist. But even if we cannot explain 
why, most of us instinctively believe—and our Constitution appears to en-
shrine—the idea that religious ideas are different in kind. A law criminalizing 
polygamy because it promotes “patriarchal . . . despotism” is constitutional; a 
law criminalizing polygamy because “Almighty God” condemns it is unconsti-
tutional.
127
 In sum, insulating secular law from religious interference is as critical 
a component of the entanglement prohibition as is the more oft-discussed pro-
tection of church autonomy. Call it the reverse-entanglement principle. 
B. The Principle: Secular Interpretation for Secular Law, Religious 
Interpretation for Religious Law 
The reverse-entanglement argument can be thought of as the inverse of a 
related Establishment Clause principle long recognized by the Supreme Court. 
The Court has historically barred the use of secular principles to interpret reli-
gious law. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
128
 the Court was 
asked to determine whether a secular state court could overturn a religious tri-
 
124. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. Nelson, 
Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802), https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html 
[https://perma.cc/42DE-V7SC]. 
125. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (analyzing the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause as two “complementary,” rather than redundant, provisions). 
126. For the broad contours of this debate, see the sources cited in Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, 
STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason 
[https://perma.cc/WQC7-WWXP]. 
127. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 166 (1879). 
128. 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
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bunal’s decision to defrock a bishop. This was no minor religious dispute: the 
question of the bishop’s legitimacy was part of a broader “American schism” in 
the Serbian Church, which the Court was in effect asked to adjudicate.
129
 Part of 
the relief sought by the plaintiff was “to have himself declared the true Diocesan 
Bishop” by a civil court.
130
 The state court ultimately rejected the Serbian Holy 
Assembly’s decision on grounds that the tribunal’s process was “not conducted 
according to the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Church’s consti-
tution and penal code.”
131
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois. Justice 
Brennan held that the Establishment Clause barred a civil court from adjudicat-
ing questions of religious doctrine. The Court identiﬁed a “substantial danger 
that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies.”
132
 
Speciﬁcally, the Court was concerned that civil courts would infringe on religious 
law by applying secular reasoning. The Justices pointed to fundamental differ-
ences between religious and secular legal traditions: 
Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are 
reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational 
or measurable by objective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due pro-
cess, involving secular notions of “fundamental fairness” or impermissi-




The Court was concerned about protecting the right of religious tribunals to put 
faith above all other considerations—even to the point where an outsider might 
see their decisions as arbitrary or irrational. A court forcing a religious tribunal 
to comport with secular notions of rationality and objectivity would create a con-
stitutionally impermissible entanglement. The Court held that when religious 
tribunals decide “purely ecclesiastical” disputes, “the Constitution requires that 
civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.”
134
 
Importantly, Serbian does not stand for the principle that all court involve-
ment with religious tribunals constitutes entanglement. After all, the holding of 
Serbian itself required a court to put the force of law behind a decision of a reli-
 
129. Radomir Popovic, Serbian Church in History: Serbian Church from 1766 to 1920, SERBICA AMER-
ICANA, http://www.eserbia.org/sachurch/1105-serbian-church-in-history [https://perma.cc
/Q32T-TPY5]. 
130. Serbian, 426 U.S. at 707. 
131. Id. at 708. 
132. Id. at 709. 
133. Id. at 714-15. 
134. Id. at 725. 
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gious tribunal. But, crucially, the religious tribunal’s decision concerned a purely 
religious dispute. That is, the Holy Assembly’s adjudication did not itself entan-
gle religious principles and secular law. By contrast, in the Court’s view, the Illi-
nois court violated the Establishment Clause when it applied “neutral principles” 
to “an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”
135
 In short, the constitutional 
offense was not opening the courthouse doors to religious disputes but entan-
gling religious and secular legal traditions. 
The Court’s holding in a subsequent case, Jones v. Wolf,
136
 revealed the power 
of this principle. Like Serbian, Jones concerned a property dispute following a 
religious schism. But whereas the state court in Serbian was asked to determine 
which side of the schism was the true church under the mother church’s consti-
tution, the state court in Jones was not called on to resolve any such religious 
dispute. Instead, it was asked to determine only whether the church’s charter 
contained a trust provision or any other instructions on how to divide up prop-
erty in the event of a schism. In short, the disputed provision in Serbian was of a 
religious nature, whereas the disputed provision in Jones was purely secular.
137
 
Recognizing this pivotal difference, the Supreme Court in Jones carefully dis-
tinguished Serbian and reaffirmed the principle that secular and religious law 
should not be entangled. The Court clariﬁed that “in determining whether the 
[church] document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust,” a 
“civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular 
terms, and not to rely on religious precepts.”
138
 That is, secular disputes call for 
the application of secular legal principles. But where “the constitution of the gen-
eral church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the own-
ership of property” and “would require the civil court to resolve a religious con-
troversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the 
authoritative ecclesiastical body.”
139
 That is, religious disputes call for the appli-
cation of religious principles. 
 
135. Id. at 721. 
136. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
137. Technically, the Jones Court remanded the decision on a minor point that precisely vindicates 
this principle. In brief, the lower court properly used neutral principles to determine that the 
church constitution allocated the property to the “local congregation” rather than the “general 
church.” But the lower court went wrong in making its own assessment of which warring 
faction constituted the “local congregation” under church doctrine. The Supreme Court re-
manded the case so that the lower court could defer to a religious tribunal on that issue. See 
id. at 606-10. 
138. Id. at 604. 
139. Id. 
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FIGURE 1. 
 Religious Dispute Secular Dispute 
Religious 
Principles 
Courts must defer to and enforce 
a religious tribunal’s interpreta-
tion of religious doctrine. Ser-
bian.  
Courts should not enforce arbi-




Courts may not do secular inter-
pretation of religious doctrine. 
Serbian; Jones.  
Courts may do secular interpreta-
tion of secular-law disputes in-
volving religious parties. Jones. 
 
The principle undergirding both Serbian and Jones directly implicates reli-
gious arbitration. Jones implicitly conﬁrms that the constitutional threat of en-
tanglement runs two ways. As the Court stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, “The ob-
jective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] 
into the precincts of the other.”
140
 And as Jones held, the Establishment Clause 
bars religious interpretation of secular law as much as it bars secular interpreta-
tion of church doctrine. The same factors that made the Illinois court a danger 
to Serbian Orthodox canon law also make religious arbitrators a danger to fed-
eral civil rights law. If religious law is to be shielded from “secular notions of 
‘fundamental fairness,’”
141
 so too must secular law be shielded from faith-based 
adjudication. When it comes to the separation of church and court, the Supreme 
Court has only had occasion to pronounce on cases in which a secular court 
posed a threat to religious law. Today, religious arbitration poses an equal but 
opposite threat to secular law. Courts should recognize a corollary to Serbian and 
Jones: a reverse-entanglement principle, under which courts should not author-
ize religion-infused adjudication of secular rights. 
This entanglement is “reverse” in the sense that commentators and courts 
have traditionally worried about protecting religious tribunals from the state, 
and not the other way around. Here, the entanglement problem is that religious 
adjudication threatens the integrity of secular law. Of course, the prevailing view 
is that religious arbitrators are private actors and thus cannot themselves violate 
the Establishment Clause.
142
 But when a secular court puts the force of law be-
 
140. 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
141. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 715 (1976). 
142. But see Michael A. Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 
124 YALE L.J. 2994, 3035-38 (2015) (acknowledging but critiquing the fact that courts do not 
treat arbitration as state action). 
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hind an arbitral decision applying religious principles to secular law, it imper-
missibly sanctions an entanglement of church and state in violation of the Con-
stitution.
143
 The following Sections delve deeper into this state-action question. 
C. Contrasting the Reverse-Entanglement Principle and a Shelley v. Kraemer 
State-Action Theory 
Although the Supreme Court has never so held, this Section makes the case 
that arbitration should be considered state action. Arbitration, legitimized by 
statute and enforced by courts, is a judicial function “fairly attributable to the 
[s]tate.”
144
 And, as some scholars have observed, there is a case to be made that 
arbitration satisﬁes the Supreme Court’s own analytical framework for state ac-
tion as set forth in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.
145




In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the Supreme Court held that a private 
party who exercised “a traditional function of the government” with “overt, sig-
niﬁcant assistance of the court” should be treated as a state actor.
147
 At issue was 
whether a litigant’s private attorney who exercised a racially motivated peremp-
tory challenge could be said to violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court 
explained that jury selection was a traditional government function. The gov-
ernment is responsible for “locating and summoning” prospective jurors, paying 
those jurors, and enforcing jury duty through the coercive power of the state.
148
 
By allowing parties to exercise peremptory strikes, courts “permit litigants to 
assist the government” in this traditional judicial function.
149
 And conversely, a 
“party who exercises a challenge invokes the formal authority of the court.”
150
 If 
the disqualiﬁed juror tries to show up for jury duty the next day, marshals will 
escort him out. In short, private parties should be treated as state actors when 
they exercise peremptory strikes because they are acting as an arm of the judici-
ary. 
 
143. See infra Section III.C. 
144. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
145. Id. 
146. 500 U.S. 614 (1991); see, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 990-1017 (2000). 
But see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 50. 
147. 500 U.S. at 624. 
148. Id. at 622-23. 
149. Id. at 620. 
150. Id. at 624. 
the yale law journal 128:2087  2019 
2112 
An arbitrator is arguably more of an agent of the state than is a private attor-
ney who exercises a peremptory strike. The arbitrator acts as trier of both fact 
and law. She holds hearings, weighs evidence, interprets legal authority, and is-
sues judgments—quintessentially adjudicative acts. And these adjudicative acts 
become enforceable through “the formal authority of the court.”
151
 The FAA’s 
deferential standard of review is another act of “overt, signiﬁcant” government 
assistance to arbitrators.
152
 Thus, under Edmonson, arbitrators should arguably 
be treated as state actors bound by constitutional constraints when they adjudi-
cate secular law. 
This would not, of course, mean that arbitrators must comply with every 
constitutional stricture imposed on an Article III judge. Many forms of adjudi-
cation, from military tribunals to agency beneﬁts determinations, are constitu-
tionally required to provide procedural due process.
153
 But the question of how 
much process is due is a ﬂexible one, and an adjudication may be constitutionally 
sufficient without providing so much as a hearing.
154
 Thus, arbitration could still 
provide an efficient alternative to a courtroom while satisfying minimal due pro-
cess thresholds. Indeed, the FAA arguably bakes in certain procedural minimums 
already.
155
 Even if this would be a radical shift in how we think about arbitration, 
it might be a good one.
156
 Considering that Congress has essentially deputized 
 
151. Id. 
152. See supra Part I. 
153. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
154. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-34, 349 (1976). 
155. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (allowing courts to vacate arbitral awards where the arbitrator was 
biased or prejudiced the “rights of any party”). 
156. Indeed, many plaintiffs have tried to bring due process claims against arbitrators over the 
years. Courts have historically dismissed these claims on grounds that private arbitrators are 
not state actors. These plaintiffs did not have case law on their side, but it seems they experi-
enced arbitration as an interaction with the state—one in which they felt their constitutional 
rights ought to apply. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(“[W]e agree with the numerous courts that have held that the state action element of a due 
process claim is absent in private arbitration cases.”); FDIC v. Air Fla. Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 
842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The arbitration involved here was private, not state, action; it was 
conducted pursuant to contract by a private arbitrator.”); Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. 
Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural 
safeguards that are encompassed by the term ‘due process of law’ cannot give rise to a consti-
tutional complaint.”); MedValUSA Health Programs, Inc. v. MemberWorks, Inc., 872 A.2d 
423, 428 (Conn. 2005) (“We conclude that, because an arbitration award does not constitute 
state action and is not converted into state action by the trial court’s conﬁrmation of that 
award, an arbitration panel’s award of punitive damages does not implicate the due process 
clause, regardless of how excessive the award may be.”). 
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arbitrators to adjudicate disputes with legal force, it might be right to insist that 
arbitrators abide by basic tenets of the rule of law.
157
 
And so long as the arbitration qualiﬁes as state action, when an arbitrator 
applies religious principles to a secular law, she violates the Establishment 
Clause’s reverse-entanglement principle. Furthermore, it doesn’t matter 
whether she does so because of a clause in the arbitration agreement or because 
of her own religious fervor. In short, this argument claims that the arbitrator, as 
a state judicial actor, may not mix religious tenets and secular rights. The argu-
ment therefore does not need to go as far as claiming that private parties may not 
contract for religious adjudication of secular disputes. That broader claim would rely 
on the more familiar state-action theory articulated in Shelley v. Kraemer
158
—and 
this Comment does not rely on it. 
The issue in Shelley was whether a court could enforce a racially restrictive 
covenant—a contract by which private parties promised each other they would 
sell their land only to members of “the Caucasian race.”
159
 When one home-
owner sold to the Shelleys, a black family, their white neighbors ﬁled a lawsuit 
to enforce the covenant. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief; on appeal, 
the Supreme Court of Missouri directed the lower court to issue an order divest-
ing the Shelleys of title.
160
 The U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, 
wanted to invalidate this lower-court order under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Clearly, the substance of the order—denying property rights to a black family on 
the basis of race—“could not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance.”
161
 But the Court 
conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment “erects no shield against merely pri-
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”
162
 Thus, the Court had to 
advance a novel theory of state judicial action to strike down the lower court’s 
order. 
 
157. On the other hand, another way to read Edmonson—and even Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948), discussed further below—is that we heighten our sensitivity to state action when civil 
rights are at stake. The Supreme Court has never articulated why lawyers exercising peremp-
tory strikes should be considered state actors when they threaten to compromise civil rights 
as opposed to other constitutional rights. But taking this restricted view at face value, arbitra-
tors should come under constitutional scrutiny at least when they are tasked with interpreting 
civil rights law. 
158. 334 U.S. 1. 
159. Id. at 4-5. 
160. Id. at 6. 
161. Id. at 11. 
162. Id. at 13. 
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Long before Shelley, the law had recognized that judicial action could consti-
tute state action.
163
 For example, the Supreme Court held in 1880 that a Virginia 
judge violated the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding black men from ju-
ries.
164
 Common misconceptions notwithstanding, Shelley’s innovation was not 
in holding that courts could violate the Constitution. Instead, Shelley went fur-
ther by holding that private parties to a contract had to comply with the consti-
tutional requirements as well, at least if they wanted their contract to be enforce-
able in court.
165
 Thus, Shelley would provide a simple avenue for imposing 
Establishment Clause restrictions on private religious-arbitration contracts. Un-
der Shelley’s formulation, the reason parties may not contract for religious adju-
dication of secular rights is because such a scheme “could not be squared with 




But Shelley’s reasoning has not been widely adopted. A number of courts 
have construed Shelley narrowly and rarely apply it outside the context of racial 
discrimination and racially restrictive covenants.
167
 The glaring shortcoming of 
Shelley is that “the decision, on its face, would require all private agreements to 
satisfy constitutional standards because the enforceability of the covenants al-
most always depends on state court action.”
168
 For instance, if A hired B to cater 
a fundraising dinner on the condition that B not loudly criticize the governor in 
front of A’s dinner guests, the reasoning from Shelley might prohibit a court from 
enforcing that contract based on B’s right to free speech. For these reasons, Lau-
rence Tribe has called Shelley a “peculiarly unpersuasive” doctrine.
169
 
It is therefore important to crystallize the distinction between the Shelley 
state-action argument and the Edmonson state-action argument advanced by this 
Comment. Imagine that two parties contracted for secular arbitration, but the 
arbitrator, a religious zealot, applied Talmudic law sua sponte against the will of 
the parties. There would be no Shelley state-action problem here—the parties 
didn’t contract for anything impermissible—but the arbitrator nevertheless 
could be violating the Constitution as a state actor under Edmonson. 
 
163. Id. at 14-16. 
164. Id. at 16 (citing Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)). 
165. Id. at 19-20. 
166. Id. at 11. 
167. Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; a Time for 
Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 84 (1998). 
168. Thomas F. Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants, 25 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 421, 443 (1984). 
169. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d ed. 1988). 
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Whether Shelley was rightly decided is ultimately beyond the scope of this 
Comment. The key insight is that the reverse-entanglement principle can iden-
tify constitutional violations without relying on Shelley. This feature makes the 
reverse-entanglement principle more powerful than Establishment Clause  
theories advanced by some other scholars. For instance, Brian Hutler has advo-
cated for a religious “non-delegation doctrine” under which courts may not cede 
“core governmental power” to religious tribunals.
170
 Hutler’s theory has less bite 
than the reverse-entanglement principle because he relies on Shelley’s argument 
that judicial enforcement converts an arbitration contract into “state activ-
ity . . . rightly subject to constitutional scrutiny.”
171
 Hutler attempts to limit 
Shelley’s problematic reach by asserting that religious-arbitration agreements are 
“different in kind” from other contracts, but he offers no argument for why this 
is so.
172
 Thus, to a reader or court hesitant to extend Shelley to the arbitration 
context, Hutler’s otherwise-promising argument fails to prove that a constitu-
tional violation has occurred.
173
 The reverse-entanglement principle does not 
need to prove that religious-arbitration agreements are a special form of contract 
or a bridge too far. Instead, the reverse-entanglement principle can apply to re-
ligious arbitration because arbitrators themselves are state actors. 
D. Contrasting the Reverse-Entanglement Principle and Prior Scholarship 
While no one has previously arrived at the reverse-entanglement principle, 
scholars on both sides of the debate agree that religious arbitration implicates 
the Establishment Clause. One group of academics has focused on the more ap-
parent entanglement concern, namely that court interference with religious tri-
bunals threatens church autonomy. For example, Michael Helfand argues that 
the Establishment Clause guarantees church autonomy to conduct religious tri-
 
170. His reasoning is more pragmatic than constitutional. Hutler argues that allowing religious 
arbitrators to meddle in secular rights could lead to “governmental favoritism” or “discrimi-
natory treatment” on the basis of religion, or to “coercing participation in religious institu-
tions” by unwilling citizens. Brian Hutler, Religious Arbitration and the Establishment Clause, 33 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 337, 350-65 (2018). 
171. Id. at 357. 
172. Id. 
173. Perhaps more problematic is that if one accepts Hutler’s Shelley argument, his theory that 
judicial enforcement converts arbitration into state action seems to generate the outcome that 
a court or “government agency,” rather than a “board of Orthodox Rabbis,” might have to 
resolve kosher disputes because “food and liquor regulation” is an “important government 
power.” Id. at 361-62. By contrast, under the reverse-entanglement principle (or traditional 
entanglement principles), it might actually violate the Establishment Clause for a secular 
court or agency to apply secular interpretive principles to Jewish food law. 




 This may explain why his article on the unconscionability of religious 
arbitration (discussed in Section II.C) stops short of mounting an Establishment 
Clause critique. Helfand appropriately recognizes that the Establishment Clause 
guarantees religious groups some freedom to adjudicate religious matters. He 
loses sight, however, of the fact that the Establishment Clause also limits this 
freedom by guaranteeing a competing right of the state to be free of religious 
inﬂuence.
175
 In short, Helfand’s focus on church autonomy is important, but it 
leaves the Establishment Clause analysis incomplete. 
Critics of religious arbitration also make one-sided arguments. Julia 
McLaughlin has explored how gendered aspects of Sharia law systemically dis-
advantage women in Islamic divorce arbitrations. For instance, she observes that 
women who perform the Hajj without their husbands may forfeit their right to 
alimony.
176
 When it comes to child custody, a father has exclusive legal guardi-
anship over his children.
177
 Furthermore, in the arbitration itself, “procedural 
rules limit the wife’s right to testify,” and her word “is given only one-half of the 
weight afforded to the husband’s testimony.”
178
 Alarmed that civil courts will 
uphold these Sharia principles, McLaughlin makes two Establishment Clause 
arguments. First, she suggests that “entanglement concerns arise at the moment 
the issue of enforcing a [religious tribunal award] is presented to the civil court,” 
as the court will be caught between improperly endorsing or improperly reject-
ing a religious decision.
179
 Second, she argues that the Establishment Clause 
“prohibits the court from becoming an agent of state-sanctioned gender bias” by 
enforcing religious tribunal awards.
180
 McLaughlin’s verdict is that secular 
courts should be prohibited from ever enforcing religious arbitration.
181
 This 
Comment shares her concern that religious arbitration poses a threat to secular 
rights. Her argument and others like it, however, come at the expense of church 
autonomy. That is, they go further than the reverse-entanglement principle by 
barring secular courts from enforcing the judgments of religious tribunals on 
purely religious matters. 
 
174. Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1891, 1918 (2013). 
175. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 79, at 1245 (focusing only on the Establishment Clause issue that 
courts reviewing a religious arbitration would be threatening church autonomy by “impermis-
sibly insinuating themselves into religious disputes”). 
176. McLaughlin, supra note 74, at 404-05. 
177. Id. at 405. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 436-37. 
180. Id. at 444. 
181. Id. at 446 (calling for a “broad nonenforcement rule applicable to all RTAs [religious tribunal 
awards]”). 
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Although this Comment has highlighted the dangers of religious arbitration 
of secular rights, the ability of religious tribunals to adjudicate religious disputes 
is a critical component of freedom of worship. As James Sonne writes of Sharia 
courts, “[T]hese private tribunals are likely more accessible and sensitive to cor-
responding matters of language or culture that might differ from the Western 
mainstream.”
182
 It is possible that an Islamic tribunal could be offensive to Amer-
ican feminist scholars yet also vindicate a devout Muslim woman’s desire to live 
by religious law. In this vein, Daniel Markovits adds that suspicion of religious 
arbitration is “a paternalistic insult to the persons whose beliefs and sentiments 
it disrespects as ideological.”
183
 In other words, the choice to submit to religious 
arbitration can be an important act of religious autonomy. Finally, religious tri-
bunals may help religious minorities carve out a place in society. Helfand, for 
instance, has advocated for a “new multiculturalism” that supports “autonomy 
and self-governance” by “minority groups.”
184
 
The reverse-entanglement principle respects both church and state auton-
omy. The principle limits the power of religious tribunals to adjudicate secular 
disputes, but it preserves their autonomy in two important ways. First, it targets 
the emerging problem of religious tribunals arbitrating federal rights without 
disturbing other well-settled practices more similar to those upheld in Serbian 
and Jones. For instance, the reverse-entanglement principle is not implicated 
when courts uphold decisions of religious tribunals applying religious law. (This 
is the upper left quadrant of Figure 1.) Thus, a court could compel speciﬁc per-
formance of a contract to deliver kosher meat, as deﬁned by a Jewish beth din, 
without running afoul of the Establishment Clause. This is important because a 
more draconian, McLaughlin-style rule barring all court enforcement of reli-
gious arbitration could systemically harm religious parties. For example, a court 
would enforce a supplier’s contractual obligation to deliver non-GMO burgers, 
where “GMO” was deﬁned by the private Non-GMO Project. Yet, under the dra-
conian rule, a court would refuse to enforce a nearly identical contractual obliga-
tion to deliver kosher burgers, where “kosher” was deﬁned by the Beth Din of 
America. This result would excuse breach against religious parties only, leaving 
them without the recourse of court protection. 
The reverse-entanglement principle also allows courts to apply secular an-
alysis to the secular terms of a contract, even if the contract also contains religious 
 
182. James A. Sonne, Domestic Applications of Sharia and the Exercise of Ordered Liberty, 45 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 717, 739 (2015). 
183. Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Con-
tract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 474 (2010). 
184. Helfand, supra note 79, at 1274. 




 (This is the lower right quadrant of Figure 1.) Signiﬁcantly, it strikes 
us that a promise to participate in religious arbitration of religious matters is one 
such secular term. A court can determine if someone agreed to show up to a re-
ligious tribunal using the same tools of contractual interpretation that it would 
use to determine if someone agreed to show up to paint a house. The reverse-
entanglement principle thus permits courts to thwart a party’s bad-faith at-
tempts to breach a contract to participate in religious arbitration of religious law. 
For example, in many Jewish prenuptial agreements, the husband and wife con-
tract to arbitrate divorce proceedings before a beth din. This is critical because a 
woman whose husband refuses to grant a divorce in a beth din is classiﬁed as 
agunah, or “chained to her husband”; she is in a “dead marriage but nonetheless 
cannot remarry” (although her ex-husband, meanwhile, can remarry due to a 
Talmudic loophole allowing men to have multiple wives).
186
 An agunah who re-
marries without a valid Jewish divorce, as well as any children she may then bear, 
will be shunned in the Jewish community.
187
 Under the reverse-entanglement 
principle, a court can compel a vindictive husband to go before the beth din by 
enforcing the contract like any other prenuptial agreement.
188
 
Second, the reverse-entanglement principle does not affect dispute resolu-
tion wholly internal to religious communities. Religious-dispute resolution has 
its virtues, such as honoring deeply held values and beliefs. Some Orthodox Jews 
believe the Torah prohibits pursuing legal claims in civil court, and studies have 
found “an increasing feeling among American Muslims of ‘individual obligation’ 
 
185. This Comment does not offer a deﬁnition or theory of what makes some disputes “secular” 
as opposed to “religious.” As the Court seemed to do in Jones, we simply maintain that such a 
distinction can be drawn, and that such a distinction is meaningful in the Establishment 
Clause context. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (suggesting that “reversionary 
clauses and trust provisions” contained in church documents lend themselves to secular in-
terpretation). Of course, some contractual disputes will be difficult to categorize as secular or 
religious. In those cases, the reverse-entanglement principle’s verdict turns on how one ﬁrst 
characterizes a particular dispute. To give one example of what we see as a hard case, imagine 
that a Sharia tribunal awarded a woman zero alimony because she performed the Hajj without 
her husband. On one hand, alimony is traditionally the province of state law, and this looks 
like an impermissible reverse entanglement of religious principles and secular law. On the 
other hand, Sharia law contains its own substantive rules about alimony, so this could also be 
an example of a religious tribunal permissibly interpreting religious doctrine. 
186. Get Refusal Basics, GET YOUR GET, http://www.getyourget.com/get-refusal-basics/#whatis 
[https://perma.cc/BK6Z-VBFL]. 
187. Id. 
188. Whether compelling the reluctant husband to go before a beth din would violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, as opposed to the Establishment Clause, is a separate question that this Com-
ment does not address. For one example of this argument, see Dasteel, supra note 115. 
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to ‘restor[e] Islamic values through creating an Islamic mediation model.’”
189
 
While courts and law enforcement should not compel or enforce religious adju-
dication of secular rights, communities are free to use other methods—including 
social pressure or even excommunication—to promote religious adjudication 
among their members. 
Finally, relying on the reverse-entanglement principle has one more beneﬁt 
for litigants: structural provisions of the Constitution cannot be waived. A pro-
ponent of arbitration might argue that freely contracting parties waive any pro-
tections arbitration would compromise. This counterargument could be com-
pelling if religious arbitration only implicated individual rights. Even Dasteel 
limits his constitutional critique to contracts of adhesion, conceding that “vol-
untarily” contracting for religious arbitration is “entirely consistent with the free 
exercise of religion.”
190
 However, the Establishment Clause creates not just an 
individual right, but a limitation on the role of government.
191
 Like the separa-
tion of powers, the separation of church and state is “not subject to waiver or 
alienation by any individual.”
192
 Indeed, Serbian treats entanglement as a bar to 
subject-matter jurisdiction, reinforcing the idea that the Establishment Clause 
creates nonwaivable structural constraints.
193
 A reverse-entanglement claim 
could help litigants otherwise held to have consented to religious arbitration. 
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conclusion 
Today, the doctrines of civil rights arbitration and religious arbitration col-
lide in a way that severely threatens parties who have suffered discrimination. 
Religious arbitration of civil rights is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s 
vision of neutral arbitration. And when a court puts state power behind a tribu-
nal applying religious principles to secular law, it creates an unconstitutional en-
tanglement of church and state. There are strong arguments that every American 
with a discrimination claim is entitled to a day in court. At the very least, the 
Establishment Clause protects these citizens from religious adjudication of their 
basic civil rights. 
The problem of religious arbitration of secular rights raises a question at the 
heart of the Establishment Clause: why is it so important to protect the lawmak-
ing process from religious inﬂuence? Early statesmen and jurists suggest an an-
swer. James Madison once wrote that “[r]eligion or the duty which we owe to 
our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence.”
194
 This has the ring of a jurisdictional ar-
gument; religion is a realm outside the authority of government, so the state has 
no power to dictate an individual’s beliefs. If a law foists religion on a citizen, the 
citizen has a trump card: the law is illegitimate, and he does not have to obey it. 
Thus, the only way to protect the legitimacy of the law—to make law enforceable 
against all citizens—is to keep religion out of it. Citizens may rebel against state-
imposed religion, but they have no analogous right to spurn secular laws. As the 
Supreme Court has stated, “To permit this would be to make the professed doc-
trines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit 
every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name 
under such circumstances.”
195
 This, ultimately, is why church-state entangle-
ment has constitutional stakes. Religious laws have no force in the public sphere, 
and a government wielding these laws has no power over its citizens. 
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